University of Minnesota Law School

Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
2014

Compliance of the United States with International Labor Law
David Weissbrodt
Matthew Mason

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Weissbrodt, David and Mason, Matthew, "Compliance of the United States with International Labor Law"
(2014). Minnesota Law Review. 320.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/320

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Article

Compliance of the United States with
International Labor Law
David Weissbrodt & Matthew Mason

†

INTRODUCTION
The United States is one of 185 member states of the In1
ternational Labour Organization (ILO). Despite
holding
a
permanent seat on the ILO Governing Body, the United States
2
is a party to only 14 of the 189 labor conventions and two of

† The authors thank Steven Befort, Laura Cooper, Karianne Jones,
Matt Norris, and César F. Rosado Marzán for their assistance in preparing
this Article. Copyright © 2014 by David Weissbrodt & Matthew Mason.
1. Alphabetical List of ILO Member Countries, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/
public/english/standards/relm/country/htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
2. These include ILO Convention (No. 53) Concerning the Minimum Requirement of Professional Capacity for Masters and Officers on Board Merchant Ships (as modified by the Final Articles Revision Convention), Oct. 24,
1936, 40 U.N.T.S. 154; Convention (No. 54) Concerning Annual Holidays with
Pay for Seamen (as modified by the Final Articles Revision Convention), Oct.
24, 1936, 7 Wiktor 297; Convention (No. 55) Concerning the Liability of the
Shipowner in Case of Sickness, Injury or Death of Seamen (as modified by the
Final Articles Revision Convention), Oct. 24, 1936, 40 U.N.T.S. 171; Convention (No. 57) Concerning Hours of Work on Board Ship and Manning (as modified by the Final Articles Revision Convention), Oct. 24, 1936, 7 Manley
Ottmer Hudson et al. International A Collection of the Texts of Multipartite
Instruments of General Interest Beginning with the League of Nations 470;
Convention (No. 58) Fixing the Minimum Age for the Admission of Children to
Employment at Sea (as modified by the Final Articles Revision Convention),
Oct. 24, 1936, 40 U.N.T.S. 206; Convention (No. 74) Concerning the Certification of Able Seamen (as modified by the Final Articles Revision Convention),
June 29, 1946, 94 U.N.T.S. 11; Convention (No. 80) Final Articles Revision
Convention, Oct. 9, 1946, 38 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention (No. 144) Concerning Tripartite Consultations to Promote the Implementation of International Labour
Standards, June 21, 1976, 1089 U.N.T.S. 354; Convention (No. 147) Concerning Minimum Standards in Merchant Ships, Oct. 29, 1976, 1259 U.N.T.S. 335;
Convention (No. 150) Concerning Labour Administration: Role, Functions and
Organisation, June 26, 1978, 1201 U.N.T.S. 179; Convention (No. 160) Concerning Labour Statistics, June 25, 1985, 1505 U.N.T.S. 39. See Ratifications
for United States, ILO, https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=
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3

eight core conventions. The United States Department of Labor declares that U.S. laws and practices “meet or exceed many
4
ILO conventions.” There are, however, significant reasons to
doubt that self-serving U.S. comment. This article examines
the level of U.S. compliance with ILO standards, particularly in
regard to the right to organize, the right to bargain collectively,
the right to strike, treatment of public employees, rights of
noncitizen workers, treatment of children, anti-union discrimination, treatment of women, and complaint procedures.
I. ILO FRAMEWORK
The ILO is dedicated to promoting four main objectives:
These objectives are to advance (1) fundamental principles of
rights at work, (2) greater opportunities for obtaining employment meeting those conditions, (3) enhanced coverage and effectiveness of social protection for all, and (4) tripartism (involving governments, employers, and workers) and social
5
dialogue in labor relations. The ILO achieves these objectives
6
through its Constitution and the related Declaration of Phila7
8
9
delphia (1944), 189 labor conventions, 202 recommendations,
the 1998 Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at
10
Work (1998 Declaration), and mechanisms for member state
NORMLEXPUB:11200:0::NO::P11200_COUNTRY_ID:102871 (last visited
Apr. 1, 2014).
3. These are ILO Convention (No. 105) Concerning the Abolition of
Forced Labour, June 25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291 and Convention (No. 182)
Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the
Worst Forms of Child Labour, June 17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter
ILO Convention No. 182].
4. ILO Standards, BUREAU INT’L LAB. AFF., http://www.dol.gov/ilab/
programs/oir/PC-ILO-page2.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
5. Missions and Objectives, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/
mission-and-objectives/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
6. ILO, Constitution of the ILO (Apr. 1, 1919), http://www.ilo.org/public/
english/bureau/leg/download/constitution.pdf [hereinafter ILO, Constitution].
7. ILO, Declaration Concerning the Aims and Purposes of the International Labour Organisation (Declaration of Philadelphia) (May 10, 1944),
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_LIST_ENTRIE_
ID:2453907:NO#declaration [hereinafter Declaration of Philadelphia].
8. NORMLEX INFO. SYS. ON INT’L LABOUR STANDARDS, Conventions,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12000:0::NO::: (last visited Apr. 1,
2014).
9. NORMLEX INFO. SYS. ON INT’L LABOUR STANDARDS, Recommendations, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12010:0:NO::
(last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
10. NORMLEX INFO SYS. ON INT’L LABOUR STANDARDS, 1998 Declaration
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/
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reporting and monitoring compliance with the conventions and
recommendations including the Committee on Freedom of As11
sociation. Aside from the Constitution and the 1998 Declaration, the most significant ILO instruments are eight core labor
12
13
conventions, addressing forced labor, freedom of association,
14
15
organization and collective bargaining, equal remuneration,
16
17
discrimination, and child labor.
II. UNITED STATES FRAMEWORK
In order to compare U.S. labor law and ILO standards, it is
important to understand the main statute and administrative
body that governs U.S. labor law. The National Labor Relations
18
Act (NLRA, Wagner Act) of 1935 protects the rights of U.S.
employees and their employers in the private sector, including
normlex/en/f?p=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_LIST_ENTRIE_ID:2453911:NO
(last
visited Apr. 1, 2014) [hereinafter 1998 Declaration]; see also ILO, Declaration
on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization (June 10, 2008), http://www.ilo
.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---cabinet/documents/genericdocument/
wcms_099766.pdf (representing the third major statement of principles adopted by the ILO since the Constitution, which builds upon and reaffirms the
Declaration of Philadelphia and the 1998 Declaration in the context of globalization).
11. Committee on Freedom of Association, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/global/
standards/applying-and-promoting-international-labour-standards/committee
-on-freedom-of-association/lang--en/index.htm (last visited on Apr. 1, 2014).
12. ILO, Convention (No. 29) Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour,
June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55; ILO, Convention (No. 105) Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, June 25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291 (ratified by the United States).
13. ILO, Convention (No. 87) Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17 [hereinafter ILO
Convention No. 87].
14. ILO, Convention (No. 98) Concerning the Application of the Principles
of the Right to Organize and to Bargain Collectively, July 1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S.
257 [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 98].
15. ILO, Convention (No. 100) Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men
and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, June 29, 1951, 165 U.N.T.S.
303 [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 100].
16. ILO, Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of
Employment and Occupation, June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter ILO
Convention No. 111].
17. ILO, Convention (No. 138) Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to
Employment, June 26, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 297 [hereinafter ILO Convention
No. 138]; ILO, Convention (No. 182) Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, June 17,
1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 182] (ratified by the
United States).
18. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012) [hereinafter NLRA].
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employee rights to organize and bargain collectively, and de20
fines certain unfair labor practices, procedures for union rep21
22
resentation and elections, and judicial review. The National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is the administrative agency
23
charged with implementing the NLRA. In 1947, Congress enacted the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA” or “TaftHartley Act”) to amend the NLRA by defining several unfair
labor practices of unions and clarifying the rights of employees
24
to refrain from joining unions. In 1959, the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) addressed the
problems of internal union corruption and undemocratic con25
duct of internal union affairs. The LMRDA amended the
NLRA by instituting union financial reporting requirements,
creating a bill of rights for union members, and imposing new
26
restrictions on union activity.
III. COMPLIANCE OF THE UNITED STATES WITH
INTERNATIONAL LABOR LAW
The principles and rights established in the ILO Constitution and 14 ILO conventions ratified by the U.S. apply to feder27
al and state labor law. The United States, however, has only
ratified two of the eight core ILO conventions, including the
convention on the abolition of forced labor (ILO Convention No.
105) and on the worst forms of child labor (ILO Convention No.
28
182). Only five other ILO member states have ratified two or
19. Id. § 151.
20. Id. § 158.
21. Id. § 159.
22. Id. § 160.
23. Id. § 153.
24. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, 29
U.S.C. §§ 141–197 (2012).
25. See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29
U.S.C. §§ 401–531 (2012).
26. See id. (placing new restrictions on the right to strike, including more
substantial limitations on picketing for representative rights and further limitations on secondary activity).
27. See ILO, Constitution, supra note 6, at art. 19; Declaration of Philadelphia, supra note 7; 1998 Declaration, supra note 10; see also Steve
Charnovitz, The ILO Convention on Freedom of Association and Its Future in
the United States, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 90, 99 (2008) (noting that as of yet the
United States has only ratified fourteen ILO Conventions).
28. Ratification of Fundamental Conventions by Country, ILO, https://
www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:10011:0::NO:10011:P10011_DISPLAY_
BY,P10011_CONVENTION_TYPE_CODE:1,F (last visited Apr. 1, 2014). The
United States has never ratified the ILO Convention No. 87 (Concerning
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29

less core conventions. Myanmar and Brunei Darussalam
have, like the U.S., only ratified two core conventions, and
Marshall Islands, Palau, and Tuvalu have ratified none of the
30
core conventions. The vast majority of ILO member states, including all the European nations with which the U.S. ordinarily
compares itself, have ratified at least four of the core conventions, and 138 ILO member states have ratified all eight core
31
conventions. The 1998 Declaration also applies to the United
States, in providing that all member states must respect, promote, and realize the fundamental principles and rights established therein—regardless of which conventions they have rati32
fied. The ILO Constitution says that member states are not
bound by the 202 ILO recommendations but are guided by their
33
principles.
Both the ILO and the United States recognize, but take
varying positions, on the right to organize, the right to bargain
collectively, the right to strike, treatment of public employees,
rights of noncitizen workers, treatment of children, anti-union
34
discrimination, and treatment of women.
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize) and ILO Convention No. 98 (Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to
Organize and to Bargain Collectively). Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. The twenty-eight European Union nations have ratified all eight core
conventions. Id.
32. 1998 Declaration, supra note 10 (including principles of freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, abolition of forced labor, elimination of discrimination in employment, and elimination of child labor). It is
particularly important that the eight core conventions are summarized into
four core labor standards mentioned above (freedom of association and collective bargaining, no compulsory labor, discrimination, and child labor) and are
considered to underpin these principles. E-mail from César F. Rosado Marzán,
Assistant Professor of Law, Chi.-Kent Coll. of Law, to authors (Nov. 2013)
[hereinafter Marzán E-mail] (on file with author). From this viewpoint, the
Constitution, 1998 Declaration, and core conventions interrelate with one another. See 1998 Declaration, supra note 10.
33. See Conventions and Recommendations, ILO, http://ilo.org/global/
standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/conventions-and
-recommendations/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2014) (stating that
recommendations are often designed to supplement a particular convention,
and are meant to provide member states with guidance on legislative development, labor policy, and management practice).
34. Cf. Complaint Against the Government of the United States Presented
by the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America, supported
by Public Services International, Report No. 344, Case No. 2460, ¶ 991 (holding that South Carolina labor laws result in the banning of certain trade unions and therefore violate Conventions 87 and 98 of the ILO), cited by
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A. THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE
The ILO considers the right to organize to be a freedom
that member states must establish and protect, without interference or previous authorization from public authorities or
35
administrative agencies. As a result, ILO standards provide
greater protection of the right to organize than the analogous
36
U.S. provisions. This greater level of protection is particularly
visible in the types of workers entitled to organize, election procedures, interference with the right to organize, and treatment
of public employees.
1. Workers Entitled to the Right to Organize
ILO Convention No. 87 states that workers “without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and . . .
join organisations of their own choosing without prior authori37
sation.” Likewise, the NLRA provides workers the right to
38
form, join, or assist labor organizations. The NLRA only ex39
tends this right, however, to statutorily defined employees.
Charnovitz, supra note 27, at 104; Steve Charnovitz, The U.S. International
Labor Relations Act, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 311, 318 (2011) (noting that
there is a substantial record of U.S. non-compliance with ILO standards).
35. ILO, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: DIGEST OF DECISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE OF THE GOVERNING BODY
OF THE ILO, paras. 272–74, 309 (2006) [hereinafter ILO DIGEST], available at
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---normes/documents/
publication/wcms_090632.pdf (stating that freedom of association principles
would be dead letter if required to get previous authorization). Previous authorization includes authorizing the right to association, the establishment of
an organization, and the need to obtain approval of an organization’s constitution or rules. Id. ¶ 272.
36. Cf. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (containing no mention of without
interference or previous authorization). While ILO norms condemn any employer anti-union speech as interfering with freedom of association rights even
if such speech is devoid of explicit threats, the NLRA permits employers to express their opinions regarding unionizing so long as there is no explicit “threat
of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.” Id. § 158(c); Marzán E-mail, supra
note 32. As long as a U.S. employer’s speech contains no explicit threats, such
anti-union free speech rights may amount to what the ILO considers “interference.” Id. Arguably, U.S. law recognizes employee rights to engage in protected activity without interference, so the question becomes what qualifies as “interference” under the separate ILO and U.S. norms. Id.
37. ILO Convention No. 87, supra note 13, art. 2. ILO standards protect a
greater number of employees than under U.S. standards. Compare id. (using
the key language of “without distinction”), with NLRA § 157 (using no analogous language).
38. See NLRA § 157.
39. Id. § 152. Additionally, the NLRA unfair labor practices provision only
applies to statutorily defined employers. Id.
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ILO standards provide greater employee coverage because
40
nearly all public employees are included. By contrast, the
NLRA excludes all federal and public employees in addition to
41
independent contractors and agricultural workers. U.S. ratification of ILO Convention No. 87 would broaden the class of
employees currently covered under U.S. law to include most
42
federal, state, and municipal employees.
Differences also exist in the treatment of managers and
supervisors. The ILO definition of manager or supervisor is
43
quite narrow, whereas the NLRA broadly defines supervisors.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the NLRA to exclude su44
pervisors and managerial employees from coverage. Under the
NLRA a supervisor may join a union consisting of rank-and-file
employees, or other supervisors, but has no legal right to organ45
ize and bargain collectively. The ILO does not exclude supervisors and managerial employees from coverage and protection.

40. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 218 (stating that a distinction in union
matters between public and private employees is inequitable). The two narrow
exclusions from ILO coverage are public employees directly engaged in the
administration of the state and officials acting as supporting elements, and
essential public services. See id. ¶ 887.
41. See NLRA § 152; see also National Labor Relations Act, NAT’L LAB.
REL. BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/national-labor-relations-act (last visited Apr.
1, 2014) (excluding “any individual employed as an agricultural laborer” and
“any individual having the status of an independent contractor” from the statutory definition of employee); Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., 107th Sess.
Mar. 11–28, 2013, U.N. Doc, available at http://archive.constantcontact.com/
fs128/1102969153793/archive/1112745186592.html (finding that the United
States is in violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights for failing to extend the right to organize to all individuals, including
non-statutorily defined employees such as agricultural workers).
42. As of 2010, only 37.4% of public workers in the United States were unionized. Mark Schneider, Ellen Bronchetti & Trent Sutton, The Financial Crisis: Ruin or Restoration of the Labor Movement?, 2 EMP. & INDUS. REL. L.
NEWSL. 18 (2010).
43. Compare ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 248 (stating that the definition
of supervisors “should be limited to cover only those persons who genuinely
represent the interests of employers”), with NLRA § 152 (stating that any individual with authority, in the employer’s interest, “to hire, transfer, suspend,
lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively
to recommend such action” when doing so is “not of a merely routine or clerical
nature”).
44. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); see also NLRA § 152.
45. See ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, LABOR LAW ANALYSIS AND ADVOCACY 42–44 (2013).
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Furthermore, such employees have the right to join a union
46
consisting of rank-and-file workers.
2. Elections
ILO standards for selecting a bargaining representative
47
provide full freedom to establish and join unions. U.S. labor
law mandates a system of exclusive representation, in conform48
ity with ILO standards. The ILO requires that minority unions are allowed to function, speak on behalf of their members,
49
and represent members regarding individual grievances. U.S.
minority unions do not have such extensive rights, since the
ability to represent and speak on behalf of their members may
50
undermine the U.S. principle of exclusive representation. The
ILO states that minority unions in the U.S. do not need to be
recognized if an exclusive representative has been legitimately
51
selected or certified. In the absence of a majority union, how52
ever, the ILO states that a minority union must be recognized.
The NLRB, following a representation election, may either
formally certify exclusive representation in the United States
53
or a union may be informally recognized by an employer. Both
formal and informal certification is permissible under ILO
standards so long as an independent and impartial body (such
54
as the NLRB) verifies the union’s majority status. A U.S. em46. See ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 247.
47. See id. ¶ 309.
48. NLRA § 159; see ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 950. A system for determining the exclusive representative must be based on precise and objective
pre-established criteria. See id. ¶ 962.
49. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶¶ 359, 974. Minority unions are those in
an exclusive representation system that failed to gain enough votes to become
the exclusive representative. Id. ILO standards protect workers involved that
wish to belong to a minority union, and allow the employees to be represented
by the minority union during grievance proceedings. See id. ¶ 975.
50. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 330–34. A majority union
may allow an employer to process a grievance with a minority union, but if the
employer proceeds to adjust a grievance without the majority union’s permission it is considered a violation of NLRA § 8(a)(5). See id. at 331–32.
51. See César F. Rosado Marzán, Labor’s Soft Means and Hard Challenges: Fundamental Discrepancies and the Promise of Non-Binding Arbitration
for International Framework Agreements, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1749 ( 2014).
52. Id. (stating that the U.S. system of exclusive representation arguably
does not violate ILO norms favoring minority unions).
53. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 76–80.
54. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 351 (“Verification of the representative
character of a union should a priori be carried out by an independent and impartial body.”); see also id. ¶¶ 925, 952–53 (citing the principle of free and vol-
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ployee or union may file a petition for a representation election
upon a showing that 30% of the employees in the unit desire
55
representation. A union must receive a majority of the votes
cast by eligible voters in the bargaining unit during a secret
56
ballot election. Under the ILO, showing of interest requirements, secret ballot elections, and a 30% threshold are all per57
missible procedures.
The selection of an appropriate bargaining unit under the
NLRA significantly affects union power. U.S. employers tend to
prefer large units that include numerous trades and occupations, while unions often prefer smaller, more manageable
58
units when seeking NLRB certification. The NLRB determines the appropriateness of the unit using a community of interest standard and places greater limitations on multi59
employer units than under ILO standards. The ILO is flexible
in determining an appropriate bargaining unit, essentially
granting the union free determination of their structure and

untary negotiation, and that employers should recognize the organization as
representative of the employees).
55. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2012). An employer may insist on an election
despite a majority showing (generally accomplished by signed authorization
cards). See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 55.
56. NLRA § 159. The NLRA provides for an election bar where no election
may be conducted when a valid election had been held within the preceding
twelve-month period. Id. Additionally, a contract-bar exists in the U.S. where
the NLRB will dismiss an election petition filed during the term of a CBA that
has a duration of less than three years. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45,
at 72; ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 969 (stating that election bars are consistent with ILO standards).
57. See ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶¶ 349, 356, 961, 969.
58. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 97–98 (arguing that smaller
units facilitate increased organization and effectiveness of the union in conducting its activities, while larger units are more diversified, making conflicts
of interest more likely, and additionally carrying a greater danger of a more
massive work stoppage). Unions, however, currently prefer to seek voluntary
recognition from an employer to NLRB certification. Marzán E-mail, supra
note 32. Unions tend to prefer larger bargaining units when seeking such voluntary recognition. See id. (stating that while unions tend to prefer big units,
it becomes harder to win an election with such units).
59. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 102–03; see ILO DIGEST, supra
note 35, ¶ 333 (establishing the freedom of choice of union structure). See also
Issue Analysis: U.S. Ratification of ILO Core Labour Standards, U.S. COUNCIL
FOR INT’L BUS. at 6 (Apr. 2007), http://www.uscib.org/docs/ilo_conventions_us_
ratification.pdf [hereinafter USCIB] (arguing that ratification of ILO Convention No. 87 would remove limitations on the formation of multiemployer
units).
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60

composition. Greater regulation and oversight surround the
61
NLRA process for selecting a bargaining representative. The
NLRB handles challenges to union elections under the NLRA,
62
and only employers can seek indirect judicial review. ILO
standards, however, provide that judicial authority should ex63
amine challenges.
3. Interference with the Right to Organize
International labor law emphasizes the principle of non64
interference with the right to organize. ILO Convention No.
98 calls for union freedom from employer and rival union inter65
ference in pursuing their activities. In violation of this principle, U.S. labor law imposes considerable limitations on union
campaigning, solicitation, distribution of union material, and
66
access to company property. Unless U.S. employees live on the
property, an employer may deny union access to the work-

60. See ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 333 (“The free exercise of the right
to establish and join unions implies the free determination of the structure
and composition of unions.”).
61. Compare id. ¶ 333 (citing the principle of free determination of the
structure of unions), with NLRA § 159 (granting the NLRB power to determine and approve an appropriate bargaining unit).
62. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 91 (stating that the NLRA
does not contain an express provision for direct judicial review of NLRB representation proceeding decisions—a review of representation proceedings may
only arise from an unfair labor practice charge).
63. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 440 (arguing that challenges to union
elections should be examined by judicial authorities).
64. Id. ¶ 855.
65. See ILO Convention No. 98, supra note 14, at art. 2; ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶¶ 855, 858 (including interference during the organization process). One area where the United States is in compliance with ILO standards
is employee privacy rights—both the ILO and the United States protect and
limit employer disclosure of information on union membership and activities.
See id. ¶¶ 177, 478 (expressing concern that keeping a register with data regarding union remembers disrespects privacy rights); Alvin L. Goldman &
Roberto L. Corrada, United States of America, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA FOR LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 146–48 (Jan. 2010),
available at www.kluwerlawonline.com/toc.php?pubcode=IELL (explaining
state privacy law limitations on employer’s concerning their employees).
66. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 275, 279, 291–96 (discussing
an employer’s ability to prohibit union solicitation during work time, “nodistribution” rules in working areas, and communication imbalances in favor
of the employer in that denial of “equal time” to unions is presumed lawful and
that a union lacks the ability to conduct a “captive audience speech”); see also
Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 252–56 (discussing and providing examples of solicitation, distribution, campaign, and access restrictions).
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67

place. Under ILO standards, unions generally have access to
68
the workplace. U.S. employers may also restrict union solicitation during work time, as well as distribution of union mate69
rial in the workplace.
Due to the amount of employer interference allowable under U.S. law, U.S. employers enjoy significantly more opportunities to communicate with workers about the consequences of
unionization as compared with unions campaigning about the
70
benefits of collective representation. The U.S. communication
imbalance violates ILO standards and provides U.S. employers
71
with an advantage throughout the organization process.
Anti-union campaigns during an organization effort are the
72
most visible example of interference allowed by the NLRA. By
permitting anti-union campaigns, U.S. law does not comply
with ILO freedom of association and non-interference princi73
ples. The United States is exceptional among ILO member
74
states in permitting anti-union campaigns. If the United
67. See Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 254–55 (describing the U.S.
standard for union access to the workplace as whether reasonable efforts permit union access to workers in another fashion, or off premises access to the
employees is nearly impossible).
68. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶¶ 1102–04. The ILO standard for union
access to company property: union access may not impair efficient operation of
the employer, and must observe due respect for property and management
rights. Id. ¶¶ 1103, 1109.
69. See Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 254–55.
70. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2012); see NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395
U.S. 575, 618 (1969) (holding that employers can communicate general views
on collective bargaining, but are not free to threaten employers or promise
benefits); GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 175; Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 223–25.
71. See ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Complaint Against the
United States, Case No. 1523, Report No. 284 (1992); Int’l Trade Union Confederation, Free Speech and Freedom of Association: Finding the Balance, at
9–10 (June 2013) [hereinafter ITUC, Free Speech] (arguing that the extent of
U.S. employer free speech rights that interfere with organization, but are lawful per the NLRA, violate ILO standards); see also File No. 25476-09-12 National Labour Court of Israel (Histadrut), Pelephone Communications LTD
(2013), cited by Int’l Trade Union Confederation, Free Speech and Freedom of
Association: Finding the Balance, at 9–10 (June 2013) (providing a potential
middle ground solution for respecting both employer free speech and employee
freedom of association rights, distinguishing between employer speech while
workers are attempting to organize a union, and the period after workers have
gained collective bargaining rights).
72. See also ITUC, Free Speech, supra note 71 (discussing the anti-union
campaign tactics permitted by U.S. labor law).
73. Id. at 9–10.
74. Id. at 116.
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States were to ratify ILO Convention No. 87, the results would
be significant; employer free speech provisions and employer
75
rights to oppose unions would be substantially curtailed.
The ILO recognizes employer freedom of expression but
holds that such expression cannot interfere with employees’
76
freedom-of-association rights. The rights of employer freedom
of expression and employee freedom of association are meant to
77
be complementary, and not in conflict with one another. Currently, U.S. labor law allows various forms of employer interference rarely seen in other ILO member states, such as captive
78
audience meetings and one-on-one meetings with supervisors.
A recent dispute that arose from an attempt by Delta flight at75. See id. at 9–10 (discussing how the USCIB concedes that U.S. law
permitting anti-union campaigning violates ILO Convention No. 87’s principle
of non-interference); see also USCIB, supra note 59, at 5–6 (arguing that ratification would conflict with NLRA § 8(e) hot cargo agreement restrictions, limit restrictions on the right to strike, and prohibit virtually all acts of employer
interference in organizing). Arguably, the United States is bound by the principles of ILO Convention No. 87 due to its membership in the ILO and the duties imposed by the 1998 Declaration. See Marzán E-mail, supra note 32.
While the U.S. may not be bound to the same procedures as member states
that have ratified ILO Convention No. 87, the United States must still meet
certain reporting requirements. See id.
76. See ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Complaint Against the
United States, Report in Which the Committee Requests to be Kept Informed
of Development, Report No. 357, Case No. 2683, ¶ 584 (June 2010) [hereinafter Delta] (stating that employer freedom of expression may not be aimed at
eliminating an employee’s freedom of association rights and ability to exercise
their free choice during a union campaign); ITUC, Free Speech, supra note 71,
at 19 (“[E]mployers have freedom of speech, but they cannot abuse freedom of
speech in ways that interfere with workers’ freedom of association and organising.”).
77. ITUC, Free Speech, supra note 71, at 19. An example of expression
crossing the line can be seen in ILO CFA Case No. 1852 (U.K.), stating that
persuasion crosses the line into interference when it unduly influences, and
that posting of notice suggesting to employees not to get involved in a rally
could be understood as a threat that amounts to undue influence. See ILO
Committee on Freedom of Association, Report in Which the Committee Requests to be Kept Informed of Development, Report No. 309, Case No. 1852,
¶ 340 (July 1998) (holding that the CFA considers the posting of notice at
work by an employer suggesting employees stay out of a rally “could be understood as a threat . . . not to exercise their trade union rights” and constitutes
undue influence).
78. See ITUC, Free Speech, supra note 71, at 1619 (arguing that captiveaudience meetings are unheard of in most countries, and are viewed as an affront to workers’ privacy, dignity, and autonomy); see also id. at 14–16 (providing an example of Deutsche Telekom and T-Mobile urging managers to immediately launch anti-union campaigns whenever union organizers attempted to
communicate with employees, and utilizing anti-campaign tactics such as
mandatory meetings, supervisor meetings, and spying on union activity).
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tendants to unionize demonstrates the inconsistency between
79
U.S. and ILO standards. Delta utilized aggressive anti-union
tactics to prevent unionization, as permitted under the Railway
80
Labor Act. After the union complained to the ILO, the Com81
mittee on Freedom of Association (CFA) expressed concern
over Delta’s active campaigning to prevent unionization, particularly through the distribution of “shred-it” buttons and fly82
ers. According to the CFA, active interference with any employee exercising free choice violates the principle of freedom of
83
association.
4. Approach to Public Employees
Under ILO standards, public employees are treated the
84
same as private employees, with few exceptions. The ILO
guarantees the right to freedom of association without discrimination of any kind to public service employees, firefighters,
and teachers, as well as agricultural and plantation workers,
85
and temporary workers. Furthermore, ILO standards permit
79. Delta, supra note 76; see ITUC, Free Speech, supra note 71, at 5–7
(“American management-style anti-union tactics are not in conformity with
ILO jurisprudence.”).
80. Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151−52 (2012); see also Delta, supra
note 76, ¶ 590 (requesting the United States to review the RLA in light of the
issues raised in the Delta case).
81. Formed in 1951, the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) examines complaints alleging freedom of association infringement. Complaints
are examined regardless of whether the relevant member states have ratified
the convention(s) at issue. The CFA may recommend to the Governing Body
that the Governing Body should draw the attention of the government at issue
to the problems presented in the complaint. The CFA has a mandate to improve working conditions, contribute to the effectiveness and principles of
freedom of association, and to promote the freedom of association. Additionally, the CFA determines member state compliance with principles of freedom of
association as laid out in the ILO Constitution and conventions. Committee on
Freedom of Association, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/applying
-and-promoting-international-labour-standards/committee-on-freedom-of
-association/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
82. Delta management encouraged employees to shred their ballots. Due
to the RLA election procedures at the time, a non-vote counted as a no vote.
Delta, supra note 76, ¶¶ 438, 582.
83. Id. ¶ 584.
84. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 218 (considering the denial of freedom to
organize to public servants as inequitable). The main narrow exception to ILO
public employee coverage is public employees directly engaged in the administration of the state and officials acting as supporting elements. Id. ¶ 887.
85. Id. The key language that distinguishes ILO treatment from U.S.
treatment (in allowing the inclusion of public service employees) is “without
discrimination of any kind.” See id. ¶ 209.
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public employee organizations to affiliate with federations and
86
confederations of workers in the private sector.
In the United States, public employees are excluded from
87
NLRA coverage. State and federal laws, however, can protect
public employees. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 governs
88
federal workers. The Civil Service Reform Act protects employee rights to join unions, regulates election procedures, and
89
establishes the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA).
Federal laws exclude supervisors and managers, while reserving the right of management to select, direct, and discipline its
90
workforce. Unlike the NLRA, federal administrative agencies
are not required to provide the FLRA with the names and addresses of all employees eligible to vote in the bargaining
91
unit—thus inhibiting efforts to organize the workers.
Most government employees were not permitted to organ92
ize until the late 1960s. Now, 36 states and Washington D.C.
permit at least some public employee collective representation,
93
often based on the NLRA model of exclusive representation.
Many states, however, limit the right to collectively organize
and bargain to particular groups of public employees and par94
ticular subject matters. Moreover, a few states have either ex86. Id. ¶ 725 (permitting affiliation if private sector rules and regulations
allow it).
87. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012).
88. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7106, 7111–7123,
7131–7135 (2012). See Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 341 (discussing
how the Reform Act protects the rights of federal government employees).
89. Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 341. The Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) determines whether a union should be established on
an agency, plant, installation, functional or other basis. Id. at 353. Additionally, the FLRA determines whether a bargaining unit ensures the fullest freedom in exercising employee rights, and whether a unit will ensure a clear and
identifiable community of interest. The FLRA is charged with implementing
the rights and responsibilities created by the act. Id. at 341, 353.
90. Id. at 341–42.
91. See id. at 341 (explaining that “Privacy Act exceptions to the Freedom
of Information Act” prevent federal agencies from providing the “home addresses of the employees in the bargaining unit”). Under the NLRA, an employer must provide this information to the regional director within seven
days after an election date is determined. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at
69 (describing the Excelsior List of Eligible Voters).
92. Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 338.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Indiana Senate Enrolled Act No. 575 (2011) (limiting the
scope of bargaining for teachers to wages and benefits); S.B. 98 §§ 5–6, 2011
Leg., 76th Sess. (Nev. 2011) (reducing the number of public employee supervisors able to collectively bargain).
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pressly prohibited the collective organization of public employ95
ees, or have no statute either granting or denying such rights.
Separate labor laws govern a number of different occupations.
Federal postal workers are governed by the Postal Reorganiza96
tion Act of 1970; and teachers, police, and firefighters may be
97
covered by separate state labor laws.
Of the total amount of state and local employees in the
United States, over one-third are covered by collective bargain98
ing agreements (CBA). Bargaining unit boundaries for state
and local employees tend to be imposed by statute and some by
government structural design—both inconsistent with ILO
99
standards. States take diverse approaches to the organizational rights of their employees, which in itself is an obstacle
100
for U.S. labor law to comply with ILO standards.
B. THE RIGHT TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY
The ILO views the right to bargain freely with employers
to address conditions of work as an essential element of free101
dom of association. ILO standards tend to provide greater
protection of the right to bargain collectively than U.S. labor
95. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40.1−57.2 (2010) (prohibiting a public employer from entering into a collective bargaining agreement).
96. Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, 39 U.S.C. §§ 1004, 1201–1209
(2012). Those without management or supervisory functions have the same
organizational rights as those in the private sector. Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 340.
97. Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 353.
98. Id. at 338 (stating that over three times the amount of employees are
covered than in the private sector).
99. See id. at 352–53 (discussing bargaining unit boundaries for state and
local employees). Under ILO standards, employees have the right to free determination of the structure and composition of their union. Imposing bargaining unit boundaries runs against the ILO free determination principle. See
ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 333 (“The free exercise of the right to establish
and join unions implies the free determination of the structure and composition of unions.”).
100. The United States is concerned that ratification of ILO Convention
No. 98 would infringe on a state’s Tenth Amendment right to determine the
terms and conditions of employment for their employees. USCIB, supra note
59, at 7.
101. Following the lead of the ILO, the European Court on Human Rights
recently held that the right to bargain collectively is inherent in the right to
freedom of association guaranteed by Article 11 of the European Convention of
Human Rights. Demir & Baykara v. Turkey, No. 34503/97, §§ 153–54 (Nov.
12, 2008), discussed by Antoine Jacobs, Article 11 ECHR: The Right to Bargain
Collectively, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION 309, 312, 315−17 (Filip Dorssemont et al. eds., 2013).
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law. Noticeable differences exist concerning the duty to bargain in good faith, mandatory and non-mandatory subjects cov103
ered by a CBA, and treatment of public employees.
1. Duty to Bargain in Good Faith
ILO and U.S. standards provide for a duty to bargain in
104
good faith. Employer economic inducements to give up bargaining rights, employer dominated unions, and employer assistance to unions (financial or otherwise) violate the duty to
105
bargain in good faith under U.S. and ILO standards. Both the
ILO and United States permit unions to bring representatives
106
from other unions or bargaining units to CBA negotiations.
Under ILO standards, failure to implement a CBA violates
the duty to bargain in good faith and the right to bargain col107
lectively. By contrast, U.S. employers are only obligated to
meet and confer in good faith but are not required to come to an
108
agreement. Additionally, labor law does not prohibit a U.S.
employer from unilaterally cancelling non-mandatory subjects
during a current bargaining agreement—although such chang109
es may violate the parties’ collective bargaining agreement.
102. Jacobs, supra note 101, at 318.
103. Id. at 326–28.
104. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012); ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶¶ 934–
43. Absent union representation, U.S. employers have broad discretion to discharge employees due to the at-will doctrine. See Goldman & Corrada, supra
note 65, at 98–108 (discussing the at-will employment doctrine and the few
limitations that apply to employers). All other ILO member states only permit
dismissal of employees for just cause. See ITUC, Free Speech, supra note 71, at
14 (“In every other country in the world, including Anglo-Saxon countries with
similar legal traditions, employers must demonstrate ‘just cause’ to dismiss an
employee.”). Several European states, including France, Luxembourg, the Slovak Republic, and Bulgaria, also obligate employers to bargain with unions.
Jacobs, supra note 101, at 326.
105. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 196–206; ILO DIGEST, supra
note 35, ¶¶ 858, 1058.
106. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 539–40; ILO DIGEST, supra note
35, ¶¶ 984–87.
107. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 943; see Marzán E-mail, supra note 32.
It is important to note that while neither the United States nor the ILO technically compel parties to come to a collective bargaining agreement, failure to
reach an agreement under ILO standards may be considered a violation of the
duty to bargain in good faith. More information would be needed to determine
whether there was a lack of good faith and on the part of whom. Failure to
reach an agreement under U.S. law is not generally considered a violation. Id.
108. NLRA § 158(d).
109. See Allied Chem. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 187–88
(1971) (holding that while a mid-term unilateral modification by an employer
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The ILO prohibits employers from unilaterally canceling any
110
bargaining agreement rights—mandatory or not. In the United States, an employer may elect to go out of business instead
of dealing with a union, as long as the motivation behind the
111
closure is not to chill unionization elsewhere.
Unlike the
United States, closure of a business does not in itself result in
112
the extinction of existing CBA obligations under the ILO.
ILO standards emphasize the principle of free and volun113
tary negotiations and the autonomy of bargaining partners.
As a result, less outside interference occurs during the bargain114
ing process than in the United States. The ILO stresses that
any unjustified delay by an employer in holding negotiations
115
should be avoided. U.S. employers, however, often delay bar-

may amount to a breach of contract, such modification only violates 8(a)(5) if
the provision is a mandatory subject of bargaining); Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 328 (“If a topic is a permissive subject of bargaining, a unilateral change can be made with regard to that subject without committing an
unfair labor practice.”).
110. See ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 942 (“A legal provision which allows
the employer to modify unilaterally the content of signed collective agreements, or to require that they be renegotiated, is contrary to the principles of
collective bargaining.”).
111. See Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 232 (stating that the Supreme Court views the choice to go out of business as a property right, and
employers may go out of business “to avoid having to deal with” unionization);
see also Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263,
275 (1965) (holding that a partial closing only amounts to an unfair labor
practice if motivated by a desire to “chill unionism in any of the remaining
plants of the single employer”).
112. See ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 1059 (“The closing of an enterprise
should not in itself result in the extinction of the obligations resulting from the
collective agreement.”).
113. ILO Convention No. 98, supra note 14; ILO DIGEST, supra note 35,
¶¶ 881, 925.
114. For example, ILO standards only allow member states to implement
rules to facilitate negotiations and promote collective bargaining. Intervention
during an impasse is only permitted if both parties approve, and the ILO is
against imposing compulsory arbitration if no CBA has been reached. See ILO
DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶¶ 933, 992–97. By contrast, in the United States the
NLRB has the power to issue bargaining orders. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra
note 45, at 135−36 (citing NLRB v. Gissel Packi ng Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969))
(describing the NLRB’s broad discretion to issue a bargaining order when a
cease and desist order may not suffice). Additionally, U.S. labor law permits
the use of economic weapons in the bargaining context. Goldman & Corrada,
supra note 65, at 328; see GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 585 (discussing
the Supreme Court’s endorsement of the “lesser” pressure of reduced pay as
par of economic pressure exerted outside of formal bargaining).
115. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 937.
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gaining in an effort to avoid unionization. While a union or
employee may file a refusal to bargain charge with the NLRB,
the economic incentives for U.S. employers to delay bargaining
117
arguably outweigh the costs. Because the complaint procedure takes an extensive amount of time, employee support for
unionization may substantially decrease throughout the pro118
cess. Absent a make-whole or punitive remedy, U.S. employers face no significant deterrent from delaying the bargaining
119
process.
Under U.S. law, unions retain a rebuttable presumption of
120
majority status. A number of ways exist for employers and
116. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (2000) (holding that an employer who engages in a lockout during the bargaining process
does not engage in an unfair labor practice); Horsehead Res. Dev. Co. v.
NLRB, 154 F.3d 328, 339–40 (6th Cir. 1998) (reversing the NLRB by holding
that an employer’s tactic of delaying meetings and “wage offer” until near the
end of an expiring agreement are allowable as “hard bargaining”).
117. A refusal to bargain charge may be filed per 8(a)(5) under the NLRA
by either a union or an employee in the bargaining unit seeking recognition.
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 160(b) (2012). The eventual court enforcement
of an NLRB cease and desist or bargaining order is unlikely to deter employers determined to delay the bargaining process in order to avoid the costs of
unionization due to the lengthy NLRB and subsequent court review process, a
loss of employee support for unionization may occur, making unionization following the review process less likely to occur. See William B. Gould IV, The
Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, Labor Law Reform, and What Can Be Done
About the Broken System of Labor-Management Relations Law in the United
States, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 291, 298–99 (2008) (discussing how employer can exploit delays in NLRB proceedings, in part due to ineffective remedies, during
which employees may lose interest in unionization and the bargaining process); see also Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 108 (1970) (holding that the
NLRA does not provide for lost compensation attributable to an employer’s delay during the NLRB process).
118. Gould, supra note 117, at 298–99, 306 (discussing how it is less costly
for employers to delay, rather than negotiate, when employee support for unionization wanes).
119. See id. (citing a “remedy crisis,” in that the current available remedies
only affect the individual, “as opposed to the collective interests of union representation”). The CFA has said that when reinstatement is not possible, the
dismissed employees should be given a make-whole remedy. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 843. Employees should be adequately compensated and such
compensation should take into account both the damage incurred and the need
to prevent the repetition of such situations in the future. See id. ¶ 844.
120. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 778 (1990);
see also GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 152–59 (discussing three scenarios where the incumbent union maintains a conclusive presumption of majority support, including one year after certification, for a reasonable time after a
union secures bargaining rights through informal employer recognition, and
during a labor agreement); Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 442 (stating
that when dealing with an incumbent union, an employer must show by objec-
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rival unions to challenge the incumbent’s representative status,
121
including filing a decertification petition, an election peti122
123
tion, or an employer refusal to bargain. The loss of recognition as the exclusive union representative may result from an
NLRB decision. ILO standards for exclusive representation
permit administrative authorities to evaluate the representative status of an incumbent union on the basis of “objective and
124
pre-established criteria.” Nonetheless, the ILO prefers a determination on the loss of recognition as an exclusive repre125
sentative to come from the judiciary.
2. Subjects Covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement
The ILO defines subjects covered by collective bargaining
as “matters . . . primarily or essentially . . . relating to conditions of employment” including wages, benefits, hours, and

tive evidence that it is uncertain the incumbent continues to enjoy majority
support).
121. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 78–81 (stating that employees in the union may file a petition seeking to decertify the existing union upon a 30% showing of interest (the process is nearly identical to a normal representation election)).
122. See id. at 63–66 (stating that the Wagner Act extended the right to
employers to file an election petition if there is uncertainty that the union still
has majority support).
123. Since representation petitions are not subject to direct judicial review,
employers often refuse to bargain in order to instigate an 8(a)(5) refusal to
bargain charge. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 73–78 (discussing
how an employer seeking judicial review of a NLRB determination on an election matter will simply refuse to bargain, and attempt to have the inevitable
unfair labor practice determination set aside due to “error in the representation proceeding”). The NLRA provides for judicial review of unfair labor practices orders, and under this procedure employers are allowed to challenge representation issues. See NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2006).
124. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 347.
125. See id. ¶ 440 (discussing how measures taken by administrative agencies regarding challenged election results “run the risk of being arbitrary” and
that “matters of this kind should be examined by the judicial authorities”); cf.
id. ¶ 687 (“Cancellation of a trade union’s registration should only be possible
through judicial channels.”). In the United States, NLRB certification is only
required for a union to compel an employer to bargain in good faith, but certification is not required for the union to bargain on a voluntary basis or enjoy
other types of legal recognition. See Marzán E-Mail, supra note 32. In certain
other ILO member states, judicial registration is necessary for any type of legal recognition. See id. Hence, a judicial role for certification in the United
States remains unnecessary. Id. If U.S. courts were required to certify unions,
it would take a significant amount of time for new unions to become certified.
Id. The current U.S. policy of keeping recognition within the province of the
NLRB helps to facilitate speedy union organization. Id.
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leaves. Unlike U.S. law, ILO standards do not distinguish between mandatory and non-mandatory subjects of bargaining
because of the right of unions freely to negotiate their working
127
conditions with the employer.
The NLRA requires U.S. employers to bargain over mandatory subjects of employment, including wages, hours, and other
conditions of employment that are almost exclusively an aspect
128
of the employer-employee relationship.
When a subject is
non-mandatory either party can refuse to discuss the matter,
129
and the other party may not insist upon bargaining over it.
Non-mandatory subjects typically fall into two groups: (1) subjects that deal with an employer’s relationship to third parties
and are “normally regarded as within the prerogative of management,” and (2) subjects that deal with the union and employee relationship and are “normally regarded as within the
130
internal control of the union.”
3. Approach to Public Employees
Public employees under the ILO have essentially the same
131
collective bargaining rights as private sector workers. Two
narrow categories of ILO employees do not have the same collective bargaining rights: public employees directly engaged in
the administration of the state and officials acting as support126. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶¶ 913, 920.
127. Compare ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶¶ 912–24 (making no mention
of a mandatory and non-mandatory distinction), with NLRA §§ 158(a)(5), (d),
159(a) (providing that rates of pay, wages, hours, and conditions of employment are mandatory subjects of bargaining and that an employer’s refusal to
bargain on these subjects constitutes an unfair labor practice), and GORMAN &
FINKIN, supra note 45, at 770 (explaining that mandatory subjects usually
“regulate the relations between the employer and the employees”). The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342
(1958), divided bargaining proposals into three categories: (1) illegal provisions, which may not be incorporated into a CBA, (2) mandatory provisions,
which both parties must bargain in good faith over, and (3) non-mandatory,
where either party may propose such a provision, but neither party is obligated to discuss it and neither party may insist upon the provision’s incorporation
to a point of impasse. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 771.
128. NLRA §§ 158(a)(5), (d), 159(a); see also GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note
45, at 771–74 (stating that the Supreme Court utilizes a balancing test to
make the “mandatory-permissive distinction”).
129. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 771.
130. Id. at 808.
131. See ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶¶ 881, 885–86 (discussing that ILO
Convention No. 98 applies to public employees, and that the right to bargain
freely makes up an “essential element in freedom of association”).
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ing elements, and those providing essential public services.
The ILO precludes dismissal of employees within these two
133
categories for union activity. Additionally, under ILO standards public employers are afforded greater flexibility in bar134
gaining than private employers.
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, governing federal
135
employees, protects federal public employee job rights, and
136
generally covers grounds for hiring and firing. Federal employees, however, cannot bargain about basic rights, including
137
wages. The Act also defines the “bargaining and contract ad138
ministrative processes” for executive branch employees. The
Federal Service Impasses Panel assists in solving bargaining
impasse disputes, conducts hearings, and imposes resolu139
tions. As a result, U.S. federal employees and unions face
greater outside interference by administrative agencies than
their ILO counterparts.
Collective bargaining agreements of U.S. federal employees
generally provide substantive and procedural safeguards for
140
employment. Tensions exist between U.S. civil service laws
132. Id. ¶ 887.
133. See id. ¶ 792 (“[T]he exercise of the right to freely remove public employees from their posts should in no instance be motivated by the trade union
functions or activities of the persons . . . .”).
134. See id. ¶ 1042 (explaining that while the “principle of the autonomy”
in collective bargaining remains valid in the public sector, public employers
should be afforded “a certain degree of flexibility”).
135. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7106, 7111–7123,
7131–7135 (2012); Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 341. Contrary to
ILO standards, the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 mandates that a CBA include “a grievance procedure with binding arbitration as a final step” that can
be invoked by either party. Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 489.
136. Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65 at 341–43 (protecting the right of
federal employees to organize and bargain collectively, implementing a system
of exclusive representation, and providing representation in grievance and
disciplinary proceedings).
137. Id. at 342.
138. Id. at 341.
139. See id. at 488 (explaining that the Federal Service Impasses Panel is
an administrative agency created by the Civil Service Reform Act that occupies a similar role as the NLRB). Unlike the NLRB, however, the Federal Service Impasses Panel’s resolutions are only advisory, not binding. Id.
140. The Federal Service Impasses Panel investigates unresolved impasse
disputes, recommends procedures to resolve the dispute, and may assist the
parties in resolution. Id. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 requires collective bargaining agreements to include grievance procedures providing for
binding arbitration. Id. at 489. The Act, however, prohibits work stoppages.
Id. at 488.
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and federal collective bargaining agreements. For example,
141
bargaining by federal sector unions cannot affect wages.
Wage rates for most federal employees are established by stat142
utory schedule. To comply with ILO standards, the ability for
143
Congress to institute wage-price controls would be reduced.
The ILO permits wage-price controls only if done for “compel144
ling” national economic interests. The institution of such controls for a prolonged period of time or over successive time peri145
ods violates ILO standards.
U.S. adoption of the ILO approach to public employee collective bargaining rights would essentially invalidate state and
146
federal collective bargaining statutes. Additionally, the scope
of bargaining would expand in federal and other U.S. public
147
sectors. The United States has expressed concern that compliance with ILO standards would infringe the right of states to
determine the terms and conditions of employment for their
148
employees.
C. THE RIGHT TO STRIKE
The ILO considers the right to strike to be a fundamental
union right, while U.S. labor law may restrict, or prohibit alto149
gether, the right to strike. Appreciable differences exist be141. Id. at 342.
142. See id. (“Because wage rates for most federal employees are established by statutory schedules, bargaining cannot affect wages.”).
143. See USCIB, supra note 59, at 7. (“Convention 98 would prevent Congress or the President from instituting wage-price controls for a prolonged period of time or over successive periods of time.”).
144. See id. (“While the ILO’s supervisory bodies have allowed wage and
price controls if they are established for compelling national economic interests . . . .”).
145. Id.
146. See id. at 5 (arguing that ratification of ILO Convention No. 87 can be
construed as requiring the “eliminati[on of] state and federal collective bargaining statutes for public employees”).
147. Id. at 7 (claiming that ratification of ILO Convention No. 98 would
“expand the scope of bargaining in the federal sector and other public sector
jurisdictions”).
148. Id.
149. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 520 (regarding the right to strike as a
fundamental right of employees and unions, but only when used to defend
their economic and social interests); see also NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2012)
(limiting a union’s ability to strike and classifying most secondary union activity as an unfair labor practice); Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 401
(“Unlike many other legal systems, American law does not constitutionally
protect the right to engage in a work stoppage. Rather, that right is established by statute and is less than complete.”). Taking account of ILO practice,
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tween the ILO and U.S. approaches, particularly in regard to
protected strikes, picketing, replacement workers, limitations
on the right to strike, and public employee work stoppages.
1. Protected Strikes
The ILO protects the right to strike as a way to defend union and employee occupational, social, and economic inter150
ests. Under ILO standards, “an acute national emergency” is
151
the only time a blanket ban on strikes can be instituted. Unlike the United States, the ILO does not restrict sympathy and
152
recognition strikes. U.S. labor law protects unfair labor prac153
154
tice strikes, the majority of private sector economic strikes,
155
work preservation strikes,
and certain organizational
156
strikes.
the European Court of Human Rights has recently held that a “clear-cut prohibition of strikes” violates Article 11, as the right to strike is a “corollary
right not to be dissociated from freedom of association.” Filip Dorssemont, The
Right to Take Collective Action Under Article 11 ECHR, in THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION 333, 364
(Filip Dorssemont et al. eds., 2013) (construing Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v. Turkey,
App. No. 68959/01 (Apr. 21, 2009)).
150. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 526.
151. Id. ¶ 570 (“A general prohibition of strikes can only be justified in the
event of an acute national emergency and for a limited period of time.”).
152. ILO standards permit sympathy strikes so long as the initial strike
the workers are supporting is lawful. Id. ¶ 534. ILO standards view recognition strikes as “a legitimate interest which may be defended by workers and
their organizations,” and consider a ban on such strikes to be “not in conformity with the principles of freedom of association.” Id. ¶¶ 535–36. Sympathy
strikes are strikes in support of another bargaining unit or union on strike,
while recognition strikes are strikes carried out by employees demanding
recognition of a union. See generally GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 355–
79 (explaining that, in the United States, strikes with an objective of recognition or sympathy are considered an unfair labor practice if certain conditions
are present).
153. See Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 259 (engaging in a strike to
protest an unfair labor practice does not violate NLRA § 158(b)(7)).
154. Economic strikes are strikes over economic issues, like wages and
benefits, and U.S. employers are permitted to permanently replace workers
who engage in economic strikes. Lance Compa & Fred Feinstein, Enforcing
European Corporate Commitments to Freedom of Association by Legal and Industrial Action in the United States: Enforcement by Industrial Action, 33
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 635, 636 (2012).
155. Work preservation strikes are done to preserve work currently being
carried out by the employees in the bargaining unit, and are considered lawful. See Note, A Rational Approach to Secondary Boycotts and Work Preservation, 57 VA. L. REV. 1280, 1280 (1971).
156. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (2012). Organizational strikes can become an unfair labor practice if: an employer has lawfully recognized another
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Noticeable differences exist concerning the treatment of
secondary union activity. ILO standards generally permit all
157
forms of secondary activity and boycotts. The United States
158
allows only a minimal amount of secondary union activity.
Peaceful, non-coercive requests to a U.S. secondary employer or
employees thereof to stop dealing with the goods and services of
159
the primary employer are permitted. In addition, a U.S. union may appeal to consumers to withhold purchasing the pri160
mary employer’s products or services. The NLRA largely pro161
hibits all other forms of secondary union activity.
2. Picketing
The ILO takes a more permissive approach to picketing
than the United States, since its standards permit prohibitions
162
only if the picketing “ceases to be peaceful.” In order to remain peaceful under ILO standards, picketing cannot “disturb[]
163
public order and threaten[] workers who continued work.”
Picketing in the United States, even if it remains peaceful, may

union; a rival union strikes within the election bar period; the strike is done
without an election petition being filed within a reasonable time; and the
strike is against an already certified union. See Goldman & Corrada, supra
note 65, at 257–58.
157. The CFA holds that legislation should not restrict the inclusion of secondary boycott clauses in collective bargaining agreements. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 915. Additionally, ILO standards provide that a ban on strikes
unrelated to a dispute that employees or a union are not a party to (secondary
union activity) violate the principles of freedom of association. See id. ¶ 538.
158. See NLRA § 158; GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 382 (considering secondary boycotts to be an unfair labor practice under the NLRA). Secondary boycotts occur when a union applies economic pressure on a thirdparty employer that the union has no dispute with regarding its own terms of
employment in order to induce the third-party employer to stop doing business
with another employer with whom the union does have such a dispute. Id. at
381.
159. See Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 267. The primary employer
being the employer the union is striking against. Restrictions on this type of
secondary activity still exist (Related Work Doctrine, Moore-Drydock test). See
GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 399–402 (discussing the Moore-Drydock
test).
160. Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 267. A union’s appeal to consumers may not disrupt the secondary employer’s business. Id.
161. Generally, NLRA § 158(b)(4) allows direct economic pressure from a
union against an employer that the union has a dispute with, but does not allow a union to put economic pressure on other employers. Id. at 266.
162. See ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 649.
163. Id. ¶ 650.
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164

be enjoined to effectuate public policy. Under the ILO, member states can require that pickets only be located near an em165
ployer—generally the only place permitted by U.S. labor law.
The United States views picketing as a free speech right
protected by the Constitution—as a result, blanket bans on
166
picketing are prohibited. The NLRA does, however, prohibit
167
some recognitional picketing.
U.S. labor law does permit
168
picketing for economic and area standards purposes. While
U.S. labor law prohibits picketing for publicity purposes
against a neutral party, other concerted employee action for
169
such purposes are considered legal.

164. See Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 264 (citing Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949)).
165. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 653; see GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note
45, at 387–88 (picketing on the property of the primary employer is considered
the most appropriate place for appeals to primary employees to carry out a
work stoppage). Picketing at a secondary site is usually prohibited by the
NLRA, except where the secondary employer is considered an ally of the primary under the “ally doctrine,” or when the primary employer is working at
the secondary employer’s business. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 388–
99.
166. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 345 (discussing how labor
picketing is viewed as “speech plus” for constitutional purposes since it involves more than pure discourse); Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 262,
264 (stating that the Supreme Court has held that labor picketing is not constitutionally protected under all circumstances, and that restraints on picketing are often permitted by the Court despite the constitutional protections of
freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and speech).
167. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (2012).
168. Area standards picketing involves a union demanding an employer to
pay employees comparable wages to other unions in the same area involved in
a similar line of work. Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 259.
169. See Marzán E-mail, supra note 32. The Publicity Proviso, NLRA
§ 158(b)(4), permits employees to appeal to the public to stop doing business
with a neutral employer in order to get that employer to stop doing business
with a primary employer with whom the employees have a labor dispute. See
Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 268. Concerted employee action for
publicity purposes, although legal, must be done through means other than
picketing. See id. (explaining that the Publicity Proviso only permits public
appeals “through means other than picketing”). For example, a union may distribute handbills outside of the site of a neutral employer requesting customers to refrain from purchasing the primary employer’s goods that are sold by
the neutral employer. Id. at 267–68. Additionally, the Supreme Court has held
that a union may ask a neutral employer in business with the primary employer to “cease doing such business for the duration of the labor-management
dispute.” Id. at 267.
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3. Replacement Workers
Under ILO standards, when permanently replacing workers exercising their right to strike, employers risk the relaxation of the right to strike and affect the exercise of union
170
rights. ILO standards state that hiring replacement workers
may inhibit the right to strike and freedom of association, and
employers may not dismiss employees who choose to exercise
171
their right to strike. Under U.S. law, employers may not
permanently replace employees exercising their right to strike
172
when the strike is protesting employer unfair labor practices.
U.S. employers may, however, hire permanent replacements
and only offer reinstatement to former strikers as vacancies
173
arise. Both the ILO and United States proscribe employers
from granting benefits to strike replacements and employees
174
who return to work.
U.S. employees face a considerable risk when striking for
economic purposes. While U.S. employers may not discharge
employees engaged in an economic strike, the employers may
hire replacement workers with no guarantee that the striking
175
employees’ jobs will be available when the strike ends. Furthermore, a U.S. employer may, under certain circumstances,
permanently replace an employee honoring a picket line in or176
der to preserve the efficient operation of business. Contrary
to ILO standards, U.S. employers have the right to inform em170. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 633; see also BERNARD GERNIGON ET AL.,
ILO PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE RIGHT TO STRIKE 46 (ILO ed., 2000) (explaining that the CFA believes hiring replacement workers is only justified
under two circumstances: (1) during an illegal strike in an essential public
service and (2) during acute national emergency). Additionally, the CFA considers hiring permanent replacement workers to be a serious impairment of
the right to strike. Id. at 47.
171. See ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶¶ 661, 663.
172. Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 406.
173. Id.
174. See ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 675 (discussing discrimination in
favor of non-strikers); GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 544–63 (reviewing
the unlawful discrimination that results from disparate treatment of strikers
and nonstrikers).
175. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 532–33 (citing NLRB v.
Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (holding that an employer can
lawfully and permanently replace an employee engaged in an economic
strike)).
176. The NLRB tends to treat an employee who refuses to cross a picket
line similarly to an economic striker. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at
355–80. An employee’s right to refuse to cross a “stranger’s” picket line, however, would be protected under the NLRA. See Marzán E-mail, supra note 32.
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ployees during the bargaining process that if a union forces a
177
strike, the employer will hire permanent replacements.
4. Limitations on the Right to Strike
ILO Convention No. 87 prohibits nearly all restrictions on
178
the right to strike. ILO standards only permit member states
179
to restrict strikes (1) of a purely political nature, (2) by work180
ers in essential service areas, (3) by public workers exercising
181
authority in the name of a state, (4) during “an acute national
182
emergency,” and (5) affecting minimum safety and occupa183
tional services.
Collective bargaining agreements in the United States
184
generally contain some form of a no-strike clause. Moreover,
when a collective bargaining agreement does not include a nostrike clause, one may be inferred for bargaining subjects cov185
ered by compulsory arbitration.
Under the NLRA, a U.S.
court may enjoin a strike when the strike is over a grievance
177. ITUC, Free Speech, supra note 71, at 12.
178. ILO Convention No. 87, supra note 13. While neither Convention No.
87 nor No. 98 mentions or guarantees a right to strike, the CFA stated as early as 1952 that the right to strike is an essential union right and that a general prohibition on the right to strike runs counter to Convention No. 87. See,
e.g., Janice R. Bellace, The ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work, 17 INT’L J. COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 269, 276 (2001); see
also ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 523.
179. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 528.
180. Id. ¶ 581 (providing that in order to be considered an essential service
area, “the existence of a clear and imminent threat to the life, personal safety
or health of the whole or part of the population” must be established).
181. Id. ¶ 574.
182. Id. ¶ 570.
183. Id. ¶ 606 (establishing minimum services during a strike action
should be limited to services where the interruption would “endanger the life,
personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population,” nonessential
services that may result in an acute national crisis as a result of the extent
and duration of the strike, or “public services of fundamental importance”).
184. See Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 414 (giving the employer
the ability to lawfully fire an employee for breaching a no-strike clause). Most
collective bargaining agreements contain a clause that prevents work stoppages and economic pressure during the existence of the CBA, and most of the collective bargaining agreements that do not include no-strike clauses only permit strikes under limited circumstances. Id. at 388.
185. See id. at 414 (“However, a peace provision will also be found by implication to the extent that there is an express undertaking to resort to arbitration . . . as the exclusive means for resolving disputes.”). Express and implicit
no-strike clauses are acceptable in collective agreements under the ILO so
long as the collective agreement had been freely negotiated. See ILO DIGEST,
supra note 35, ¶¶ 533, 881.
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186

the parties are bound to arbitrate. U.S. labor laws also restrict most recognitional strikes, strikes that occur during the
insulated period prior to the expiration of a CBA, and hot cargo
187
agreements. By contrast, ILO standards view the right to
188
strike as a natural “corollary to the right to organize.”
If the United States were to ratify ILO Convention No. 87,
most of the restrictions on secondary union activity would be
189
prohibited. Currently, the United States prohibits secondary
strikes that induce or encourage a strike or other refusal to
190
handle goods. In addition, U.S. laws prohibit strikes that
191
threaten, coerce, or restrain any person. U.S. labor laws ban
192
strikes to achieve secondary boycotts.
The ILO does not comment on the permissibility of lockouts; some member states permit lockouts, while others prohib193
it lockouts. In the United States, lockouts are permissible ab194
sent proof of an unlawful motive. A lockout in the United
186. See generally Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 390–92 (discussing grievance procedure and arbitration).
187. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2012). The insulated period is the 60 day
window before the expiration of a CBA. Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at
411. A strike that occurs during the insulated period causes employees to lose
their protected status under the NLRA, and may in turn be dismissed by employers without violating § 158(a)(3). Id. Hot cargo agreements are prohibited
by § 158(e) of the NLRA. NLRA § 158(e). Hot cargo agreements essentially are
clauses with an employer not to handle goods produced by another employer
with whom the union has a dispute, or that the union will refuse to handle
non-union material. See Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 273.
188. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 523. ILO Convention No. 98 “prohibits
nearly all restrictions on the right to strike,” including many limitations and
restrictions allowable under U.S. labor law. USCIB, supra note 59, at 7.
189. See USCIB, supra note 59, at 5–7 (including restrictions on hot-cargo
agreements and secondary boycotts).
190. NLRA § 158(e).
191. NLRA § 158(b)(4).
192. NLRA § 158(b).
193. E.g. Igor Chernyshev, Decent Work Statistical Indicators: Strikes and
Lockouts Statistics in the International Context, ILO 8–10 (June 1, 2003),
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/download/articles/2003-3.pdf
(displaying strikes and lockouts statistics for ILO nations). While the right to
strike derives from ILO Convention No. 87 through Article 3 (establishing the
right of unions to “organize their administration and activities and to formulate their programmes”) and Article 10 (establishing the right of unions to
pursue aims that work toward “furthering and defending the interests of
workers or of employers”), no convention establishes a similar right to conduct
a lockout. GERNIGON ET AL., supra note 170, at 8
194. The NLRA permits both offensive (when an employer and union are at
a bargaining impasse) and defensive (threat to enhance the employer’s bargaining power) lockouts. See Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 330; see
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States must also have a “business or bargaining justification”
195
and must not be “designed to destroy the union.”
5. Public Employee Work Stoppages
The ILO extends the fundamental right to strike, with few
196
limitations, to public employees. Public workers in essential
197
services and public servants exercising authority in the name
198
of the state may be prohibited from work stoppages. The ILO
allows a minimum safety service limitation “to the extent nec199
essary to comply with statutory safety requirements.” In addition, the ILO permits a minimum operation service limitation
for public services of fundamental importance, as well as for
non-essential services where the extent and duration of a work
200
stoppage might result in an acute national emergency. If the
United States were to comply with ILO standards, federal and
state governments would face a reduced ability to restrict pub201
lic employees’ right to strike. While the ILO provides compensation to those whose right to strike may be restricted, the
United States does not generally offer any such compensa202
tion.

also id. at 388 (arguing that contractual prohibitions against employer lockouts are, however, nearly as common as no-strike clauses).
195. Id. at 330.
196. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶¶ 574, 576.
197. Id. ¶ 576. Compare id. ¶ 606 (defining minimum services as services
where “the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal safety or
health of the whole or part of the population”), with GORMAN & FINKIN, supra
note 45, at 589–95 (discussing how an injunction may be issued if a strike, “affecting an entire industry or a substantial part of an industry engaged in interstate commerce, endangers or will endanger the national health or safety”).
ILO standards disapprove of defining essential services as those that interfere
with commerce since a “broad range of legitimate strike action could be impeded.” ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 592.
198. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶¶ 574, 576. Employees in state-owned
commercial and industrial enterprises retain their right to strike. Id. ¶ 577.
199. Id. ¶ 604.
200. Id. ¶ 606. An impartial and independent body settles disagreements
on what is considered essential for purposes of minimum operation service
limitations. Id. ¶ 613. This approach is similar to the NLRA.
201. See USCIB, supra note 59, at 7.
202. See ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶¶ 596, 600 (providing that compensation generally includes a corresponding denial of an employer’s right to lockout, and adequate, impartial, and speedy arbitration proceedings).
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Currently, most public employee work stoppages are pro203
hibited in the United States. A number of alternatives do exist for U.S. state and local employees. In most states, either
204
party can call for intervention by way of state mediation. At a
bargaining impasse, most states allow either side to initiate a
205
fact-finding procedure to help resolve a dispute. The majority
of U.S public strikes result from municipal or school district
206
employees.
U.S. federal law imposes greater penalties for illegal public
work stoppages than international labor law. For example, a
union can be decertified if it encourages workers to participate
207
in a prohibited work stoppage. Additionally, employees may
be prosecuted, a court may issue an injunction, and employees
can become disqualified from further federal employment for an
208
indefinite period of time. Under ILO standards, decertifica209
tion should only be possible through judicial channels. The
difference in treatment of public employee work stoppages creates a gulf between U.S. labor law and ILO standards.
D. PROTECTION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE
While the ILO and the United States provide similar levels
of protection against anti-union discrimination, ILO standards
afford greater protection for women, children, and noncitizen
employees.
1. Protection Against Anti-Union Discrimination
The ILO considers anti-union discrimination to be one of
the most serious violations of freedom of association princi210
ples. Under the ILO, the CFA makes sure the anti-union discrimination standards set by member states are in accordance

203. See Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 405 (“In the minority of
states that permit public employee strikes, the right to strike is not extended
to all government workers.”).
204. Id. at 338.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 404. In 1981, President Reagan attempted to enforce prohibitions of public employee work stoppages by dismissing 11,000 air traffic controllers. Id. at 405.
207. Id. at 405.
208. Id.
209. See ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 687.
210. Id. ¶ 769 (maintaining that anti-union discrimination “may jeopardize
the very existence of trade unions”).
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211

with freedom of association principles. ILO Convention No.
98 provides that employees are protected against discrimina212
tion during hiring, employment, and dismissal. U.S. labor
laws provide similar protection as the ILO, but exclude more
213
employees from coverage. In order to amount to an antidiscrimination violation under the NLRA, an employee must
show that (1) the discrimination occurred “because of union activity or affiliation,” (2) the discrimination resulted in “adverse
or favored treatment,” and (3) the treatment “tended to encour214
age or discourage union membership or activity.” Additionally, ILO and U.S. remedies for anti-union discrimination are the
215
same—a combination of reinstatement and back pay.
Furthermore, the ILO emphasizes increased antidiscrimination protection for union representatives and lead216
ers. The few situations where ILO standards do not protect
union representatives and leaders from dismissal include the
performance of union activities on employer time, the use of an
employer’s personnel for union purposes, and the use of one’s
business position to put improper pressure on another employ217
ee. U.S. labor laws provide union officials with some level of
218
special employment protections during their tenure in office.
211. Id. ¶ 774.
212. ILO Convention No. 98, supra note 14, at 258–61.
213. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157–158 (2012) (forbidding discrimination due to
union activity in hiring, firing, and other means of employment, and providing
an analogous level of coverage to the right to organize); see also NLRA § 152(3)
(defining who constitutes an employee for NLRA purposes).
214. Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 230.
215. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 187, 192 (stating that NLRA
§ 10(c) grants the NLRB the ability to require reinstatement and backpay for
NLRA § 8(a)(3) anti-union discrimination violations); ILO DIGEST, supra note
35, ¶¶ 837, 841, 843 (providing, furthermore, that if reinstatement is not possible, the victim should be wholly compensated).
216. “[A]dditional measures should be taken to ensure fuller protection for
leaders of all organizations . . . against any discriminatory acts.” ILO DIGEST,
supra note 35, ¶ 773; see also id. ¶¶ 799–801 (emphasizing that worker representatives are entitled to “effective protection against any act prejudicial to
them . . . based on their status or activities as workers’ representatives”).
217. Id. ¶ 809. The performance of union activities on employer time and
the use of an employer’s personnel for union purposes may, however, be protected against anti-union discrimination if an agreement, between the union
officers and the employer, allowing such activities is in place. See id. ¶¶ 800,
809.
218. U.S. employers may give special benefits to union representatives
with responsibilities in administrating the CBA. See Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 236. For example, a CBA often gives special seniority to union
representatives to protect them “from layoff and grant them early recall” as
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2. Protection Against Discrimination
The 1998 Declaration considers the elimination of discrimination in employment to be a fundamental principle and right
219
at work. As an ILO member state, the United States must respect, promote, and realize the fundamental principles and
220
rights established in the 1998 Declaration. The ILO (through
Convention No. 111) and the United States (through Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) both prohibit discrimination on
221
the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin. Additionally, ILO standards and U.S. labor laws grant certain employers a bona fide occupational qualification during the hiring
process, allowing them to take into account otherwise prohibit222
ed employee characteristics. In the United States, occupational qualifications must apply to the essence of an employer’s
business and must be reasonably necessary for the normal op223
eration of business.
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a U.S. employer may
not retaliate against an employee who has made a charge, as224
sisted with, or participated in a Title VII investigation. The
two most common Title VII violations are disparate treatment
violations (which require an intent to discriminate) and dispar225
ate impact violations (no intent to discriminate necessary).
long as the benefited representatives “need to be available in the workplace to
perform their responsibilities administering the collective agreement.” Id. The
NLRA prohibits granting special benefits “that are unrelated to facilitating
the union representative’s ability to counsel and speak for the workers.” Id. at
237.
219. See 1998 Declaration, supra note 10, at art. 2(d).
220. Id. at art. 2.
221. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–
2000e-17 (2012); ILO Convention No. 111, supra note 16, at 32–37. In addition, ILO Convention No. 111 provides for the right to pursue economic wellbeing in conditions of freedom, dignity, and economic security. Id. at 32–33.
222. See ILO Convention No. 111, supra note 16, at 32 (“Any distinction,
exclusion or preference in respect of a particular job based on the inherent requirements thereof shall not be deemed to be discrimination.”); Goldman &
Corrada, supra note 65, at 193–94 (discussing how the Supreme Court takes a
narrow approach to what constitutes a bona fide occupational qualification).
223. See Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 194. The burden lies with
the employer to show that a bona fide occupational qualification exists. Id.
224. Title VII, 42 U.S.C § 2000e-3(a). To be considered employer retaliation, an employer’s actions must be materially adverse enough “to dissuade a
reasonable employee from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”
Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 204.
225. For a disparate treatment violation, establishing a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case creates an inference of unlawful intent. To do this, the
plaintiff must show four elements—that the employee is a member of a pro-
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Affirmative action remains a relatively unique concept to
226
U.S. labor law, and continues to be a controversial issue. The
Supreme Court upheld the use of affirmative action when
227
adopted for remedial purposes and developed a two-part test.
Affirmative action programs must be aimed at correcting a
“manifest imbalance” in a traditionally segregated job catego228
ry,” and must not “unduly” trample on the interests of major229
ity group members.
Furthermore, affirmative action programs may not be used to maintain a racially balanced
230
workforce but rather only to obtain one.
3. Women in the Workplace—Equal Pay for Equal Work
The ILO Constitution’s Preamble and ILO Convention No.
100 establish the principle of “equal remuneration for work of
231
equal value.” U.S. labor law protects women’s wages through
tected class, was qualified for the position, and suffered adverse action, and
that the employer treated persons outside the protected class differently.
Gorman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 192; see also id. at 192–97 (discussing
the application of disparate treatment law). Disparate impact violations are
practices that may be fair in form but are discriminatory in operation. Id. at
197; see also id. at 197–98.
226. See id. at 194–96 (stating that the lawfulness of affirmative action is
one of the most controversial issues in U.S. labor law); see also ILO DIGEST,
supra note 35 (making no mention of affirmative action).
227. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208–09
(1979); Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 194–97 (explaining that affirmative action plans must be remedial and satisfy a two-part test); see also 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (prohibiting certain forms of discrimination in the workplace); 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1 (2013) (stating that an employer who takes voluntary action to “improve opportunities for minorities and women” in order to
“overcome the effects of past or present . . . barriers to equal employment opportunity” is insulated from the unlawful employment practices named in Title VII).
228. Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 195 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (adding that a showing of disparity between the minority or women
workers and those in the labor pool is required to demonstrate a manifest imbalance).
229. See United Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 208 (stating that the affirmative
action plan at issue does not “unnecessarily trammel” the interests of the majority group members); Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 195 (discussing
what “unnecessarily trammel” means).
230. See Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 195 (“Moreover, an affirmative action plan may be used only to attain, and not to maintain, a racially
balanced workforce.”). The Supreme Court thus far has only considered the
lawfulness of affirmative action plans “when a remedial purpose was put forward to justify the plan.” Id.
231. ILO, Constitution, supra note 6, at 40 (emphasis omitted); accord ILO
Convention No. 100, supra note 15, at 36.
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the Equal Pay Act, which prohibits discrimination in wages
paid for “equal work on jobs the performance of which requires
equal skill, effort and responsibility and which are performed
233
under similar working conditions.” Accordingly, the general
U.S. standard under The Equal Pay Act provides for equal pay
234
for substantially equal work, whereas the ILO standard pro235
vides for equal pay for “comparable work,” or work of “compa236
rable worth.” Due to this difference in the standard—equal
work versus comparable work—U.S. labor law provides weaker
237
protection against wage discrimination than ILO standards.
4. Treatment of Child Workers
ILO Convention No. 138 allows member states to set internal minimum age standards but requires that the minimum
age of child employment be no lower than the age of completion
238
of compulsory schooling. Additionally, ILO Convention No.
138 requires a minimum age of eighteen for work “likely to
239
jeopardise the health, safety, or morals.” While U.S. labor law
conforms to many requirements of ILO Convention No. 138,
232. See The Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012) (prohibiting wage discrimination on the basis of sex); Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 214–16
(stating that the Equal Pay Act covers all employees covered by the Fair Labor
Standards Act (in addition to executive, administrative, and professional employees), and claiming that the Equal Pay Act is aimed solely at the elimination of unequal pay based on sex).
233. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 215 (explaining that a prima facie violation of the Equal Pay Act arises when there exists unequal pay for equal
work at the same place of business due to sex).
234. See 29 C.F.R. § 1620.13 (2013) (“The equal work standard does not require that compared jobs be identical, only that they be substantially equal.”).
235. See Edward E. Potter, The Growing Significance of International Labor Standards on the Global Economy, 28 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 243,
258 (2005).
236. See, e.g., Christopher McCrudden, Comparable Worth: A Common Dilemma, 11 YALE J. INT’L L. 396, 402 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(discussing the history of the concept of equal pay for work of “comparable
worth”).
237. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1620.13 (providing substantially equal work
standard), and Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 215 (“[W]ithout unequal
pay for equal work, there is no Equal Pay Act violation, even if a woman is being paid less because she is a woman.”), with ILO Convention No. 100, supra
note 15, at 304–07 (providing an equal pay for equal work standard).
238. The ILO sets the minimum age of child employment at fifteen, with
the possibility of fourteen for insufficiently developed countries. ILO Convention No. 138, supra note 17, at 298–301.
239. Id. at 300. Types of employment considered to be “likely to jeopardise
the health, safety, or morals” are determined at the national level. Id.
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conflicts exist in areas of youth employment that are exempt
from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and state child labor
240
laws. The FLSA protects child workers in the United States
by prohibiting most employment of children under fourteen and
by restricting the types of employment, hours, and conditions of
241
children under eighteen.
The United States has ratified ILO Convention No. 182,
242
which seeks to eliminate the worst forms of child labor. ILO
Convention No. 182 applies to all child workers under eight243
een. The Convention also prohibits the use of children in
slavery or similar practices, in pornography, in work likely to
harm the child’s health, safety, or morals, and the procuring or
244
offering of a child for illicit activities’. In addition, ILO Convention No. 182 requires member states to take effective
measures to promote the education of children—in particular,
children who have been exposed to the worst forms of child la245
bor.
5. Rights of Noncitizen Employees
ILO standards provide that, once employed, everyone is entitled to protection against anti-union discrimination without
246
regard to citizenship status. The ILO provides greater protection of noncitizen employees and criticizes the U.S. approach
for not providing adequate protection to undocumented workers
240. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219
(2012). The FLSA prohibits all employment of children under fourteen when
the enterprise “ships goods in interstate commerce.” Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 93. Children age fourteen and fifteen may not be employed in
manufacturing and mining. Additional FLSA limits apply to children ages sixteen and seventeen across various industries. Id. State child labor laws often
provide additional limits to child employment. See id. at 93–94; USCIB, supra
note 59, at 8 (arguing that U.S. compliance with ILO Convention No. 138
would be difficult due to “widely varied” state child labor laws).
241. See supra note 240.
242. ILO Convention No. 182, supra note 3, at 163–64. The ILO intended
ILO Convention No. 182 to complement ILO Convention 138. See id.
243. Id. at 164–65.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 165–66.
246. See David Weissbrodt, Remedies for Undocumented Noncitizens in the
Workplace: Using International Law to Narrow the Holding of Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1424, 1430 (2008) (stating that
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has held that once the employment relationship has begun, the noncitizen worker “acquires rights as a
worker . . . irrespective of his regular or irregular status in the State of employment”).
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who choose to exercise their freedom of association rights. In
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, an undocumented
employee distributed authorization cards as part of a unioniza248
tion effort, and his employer subsequently terminated him.
The NLRB found that the employer had illegally fired the un249
documented employee and ordered back pay as relief. The
Supreme Court, citing conflict with public policy goals of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), vacated
250
the NLRB’s award of back pay. The Court reasoned that the
undocumented employee should not be able to recover back pay
since he was a noncitizen and fraudulently obtained employ251
ment. As a result, the only available remedies to protect undocumented employees who exercise their freedom of association rights are the issuance of a cease and desist order and
252
posting of notice at the employer’s business.
The CFA issued a decision regarding Hoffman and expressed concern that removing back pay as a viable remedy for
253
noncitizens could harm worker safety and well-being. In fact,
the CFA found the Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman to violate the fundamental principles behind the ILO constitution, as
the Hoffman decision functionally denied noncitizen employees
254
the freedom to associate and join unions. The CFA criticized
the Supreme Court’s weighing of the policy goals of the IRCA
against the available remedies under the NLRA, stating that

247. See ILO, Report in Which the Committee Requests to Be Kept Informed of Development ¶¶ 555, 559–68, 610 (Nov. 2003), http://www.ilo.org/
dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:50002:P50002_COMPLAINT_TEXT_ID:2907332
[hereinafter CFA Case No. 2227] (concluding that the NLRB’s remedial
measures are “inadequate to ensure effective protection against acts of antiunion discrimination”).
248. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2001).
249. Id. at 140–41.
250. See id. at 140. The undocumented employee had fraudulently obtained
employment. The Supreme Court declined to address whether back pay may
be an appropriate remedy in instances where the employer knowingly hired an
undocumented worker in violation of the IRCA. See Weissbrodt, supra note
246, at 1426–27.
251. See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 150–51. In the years since the Hoffman decision, U.S. courts remain confused about the scope of Hoffman and what employment remedies under the NLRA are unavailable to undocumented workers. Weissbrodt, supra note 246, at 1445.
252. CFA Case No. 2227, supra note 247, ¶ 609.
253. See id. ¶ 565; Weissbrodt, supra note 246, at 1431.
254. See Weissbrodt, supra note 246, at 1431.

1878

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:1842

human rights must always have priority over public policy
255
goals.
Additionally, the CFA criticized the available remedies for
undocumented employees under U.S. labor law—the U.S. remedies for undocumented workers serve only as possible deterrents for future employer discriminatory acts, though they do
not sanction the actual discriminatory act committed by the
256
employer. As of November 2011, the CFA still considers the
United States to be in violation of ILO standards pertaining to
257
the rights of undocumented employees.
CONCLUSION
The United States and the ILO take varying approaches to
the right to organize, the right to bargain collectively, the right
to strike, treatment of public employees, the rights of noncitizen workers, treatment of children, anti-union discrimination,
and treatment of women. Despite being bound to respect and
promote the principles and rights established in the ILO Constitution and the principle of freedom of association, the United
States tends to provide lower levels of coverage and protection
for employees than required by ILO standards. The lower level
of protection and coverage for U.S. employees remains especially visible in the right to strike, treatment of public employees,
and rights of noncitizen workers. To achieve a higher level of
compliance with ILO standards, the United States would need
to ratify a greater number of conventions (particularly the core
conventions) and accept more recommendations.

255. See id.
256. CFA Case No. 2227, supra note 247, ¶ 609.
257. See ILO, Effect Given to the Recommendations of the Committee and
the Governing Body ¶ 52 (Nov. 2011), http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=
1000:50002:0::NO:50002:P50002_COMPLAINT_TEXT_ID:2907354.

